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TRIBAL CONSIDERATIONS IN COMITY AND FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT ISSUES
B. J. JONES*
One of the more positive recent developments in tribal/state
relations has been the increasing tendency on the part of the judicial systems of each sovereign to recognize the decisions of their
counterparts.' This mutual respect, especially as directed toward
tribal court decisions, is critical to the continued recognition of tribal courts as competent courts to resolve disputes affecting Indians
as well as non-Indians.2 Accordingly, there has been much discussion regarding the necessity of such recognition to the future of
tribal adjudicatory systems.3

Conversely, there has been little or no discourse on the obligations of tribal courts to reciprocate with similar treatment of state

court judgments. The absence of such commentary should not
lead one to believe that activity is not afoot in this area. Many
tribes have enacted legislation which requires their court systems
to recognize state court judgments, especially in the area of
domestic relations. 4
Likewise, many tribal courts have recognized state court judgments in appropriate instances, but these decisions are not widely
disseminated among attorneys not practicing in the area of Indian
* B.A., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1981; J.D., University of
Virginia, 1984. Managing Attorney for Dakota Plains Legal Services on the Standing Rock
Sioux Indian Reservation. Member of the South Dakota, North Dakota and Virginia bars as
well as a member of the U.S. District Court for South and North Dakota, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court. Associate Appellate Judge for
the Turtle Mountain Chippewa Appeals Court.
1. See, e.g., Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, 462 N.W.2d 164 (N.D. 1990); Mexican
v. Circle Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737 (S.D. 1985).
2. Despite recent United States Supreme Court decisions restricting tribal court
criminal jurisdiction, a tribal court's civil jurisdiction remains broad. See Duro v. Reina, 495
U.S. 676, 687 (1990). The Supreme Court has recognized that tribal courts play an
important role in resolving disputes between Indians and non-Indians. See National
Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,
480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
3. See Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal
Jurisdiction,31 ARIZ. L. REv. 329, 335-47 (1989); Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the
Federal Union, 26 WILLIAMErrE L. REV. 841, 905-908 (1990).
4. For example, the Maricopa Ak-Chin Community in Arizona has enacted a full faith
and credit provision in its tribal code. AK-CHIN TRIBE CODE tit. 5, § 5.7 (1980)
microformed on Microfiche Collection of Indian Tribal Law Codes (Marian Gould Gallagher
Law Library). Other tribes have enacted similar provisions. COLVILLE TRIBE CODE tit. 3.7,
§ 3.7.01 (1988) microformed on Microfiche Collection of Indian Tribal Law Codes (Marian
Gould Gallagher Law Library). The author is also aware of several other tribal courts that
routinely honor state court judgments without express legislative authority under the
doctrine of comity.
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law and they are therefore frequently overlooked.'
There is a critical distinction between the origins of a state
court's obligation to grant deference to other court decisions as
compared to the genesis of a tribal court's obligation. A state court
has an obligation under the full faith and credit provisions of the
federal Constitution and under federal statutes to honor the orders
of sister states, federal courts and territorial courts.6 Several courts
have held that this federal obligation extends to recognizing tribal
court decisions as "territorial" court decisions under section 1738
of title 28 to the United States Code. 7
Accordingly, the exercise of comity by a state court is not the
exercise of an inherent sovereign right, but instead is a recognition
by the state that in the federalist scheme its exercise of authority is
subordinate to that of the federal government which may dictate,
even to its courts. The result, of course, is a certain degree of uniformity among state courts in honoring the judicial decrees of
other courts.
Tribal courts, on the other hand, do not fit easily into the federalist scheme contemplated by the framers of the Constitution.
Most are the product of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,8
wherein Congress expressly permitted tribes to discard Department of Interior Courts, to enact their own laws and to be governed by them.9 Congress has only once, by the passage of the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, expressly dictated to tribes what
substantive and procedural laws they must afford to alleged
criminals who come before them. 10 With that exception, tribes
have generally had the unfettered discretion to enact whatever
laws and procedures they chose to govern themselves."
5. Many tribal court decisions are compiled and disseminated in a reporter called the
Indian Law Reporter published by the American Indian Lawyer Training Program, Inc.
6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
7. See Lohnes v. Cloud, 254 N.W.2d 430, 433 (N.D. 1977); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655
P.2d 895 (Idaho 1982); Jim v. CIT Financial Services, 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975); In re
Adoption of Buehl, 555 P.2d 1334 (Wash. 1976). For an excellent discussion of the cases
holding that tribal courts are territorial courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, see Tracey v.
Superior Court of Maricopa County, 810 P.2d 1030 (Ariz. 1991).
In Lohnes, the North Dakota Supreme Court seemed to intimate that 28 U.S.C. § 1738
mandated state court recognition of tribal decrees, but distanced itself somewhat from that
position in Fredericks by adopting comity as the appropriate standard for judging tribal
court decisions. Lohnes, 254 N.W.2d at 433-34; Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, 462
N.W.2d 164 (N.D. 1990).
8. 25 U.S.C. § 461-479 (1988).
9. Most tribes accepted the invitation and created their own court systems, although
some smaller tribes are still governed by courts of Indian Offenses. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.1
(1991).
10. 25 U.S.C. § 1301-03 (1988).
11. Congress has the authority to abrogate a tribe's immunity and require it to apply
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Most courts have recognized this and have thwarted attempts
by litigants to equate tribes with states under full faith and credit
statutes and similar statutes demanding comity." These decisions,
as well as Congress' non-interference in this area, are consistent
with the present federal policy of encouraging tribal court selfdevelopment as an aspect of tribal sovereignty.' 3
A tribe's decision to exercise its inherent sovereignty and
enact full faith and credit or comity legislation is dependent on
several factors. First and foremost, most tribes look at the respect
and deference states have afforded their institutions in making the
decision. This may lead to an impasse in tribal and state court relations if neither is willing to take the initiave and recognize the
others' decrees. The Idaho Supreme Court has even mentioned
this impasse in resolving itself to recognize tribal court decisions.14
Another tribal concern is the extent to which a required recognition of state decisions would lead to an evisceration of traditional or customary law. Many tribal courts rely heavily upon
traditional unwritten law to determine an outcome in a particular
case. An excellent example of tribal reliance on tradition is the
South Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Mexican v. Circle
Bear.'" In Circle Bear, the court was confronted with a tribal court
decision concerning the custody of a dead body, which ran contrary to a plain and concise state statute.' 6 The court, in upholding the tribal court decree, recognized the importance of
7
traditional law in a tribal forum.'
Congress recognized the important role tradition plays in the
resolution of disputes among Indian people by requiring states
which accepted jurisdiction over Indian land to apply traditional
law in resolving tribal disputes.' 8 There is no law, however, which
certain laws, but even the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301, has not done that.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
12. See DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Court, 874 F.2d 510, 513-14 (8th Cir. 1989)
(rejecting an argument that a tribe is a state under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A). Another federal court has held that a tribe should be treated as a
state under that Act. See In re Larch, 872 F.2d 66, 68 (4th Cir. 1989).
13. For statutes promoting tribal sovereignty, see the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25
U.S.C. § 1451-1543 (1988); the Indian Self Determination Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450-450n
(1988); the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1901-1963 (1988).
14. A footnote in Sheppard, indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court was concerned
about a recent tribal court decision refusing to honor a state court judgment and was
beseeching the tribal court to reconsider its decision. Sheppard, 655 P.2d at 902 n.2.
15. 370 N.W.2d 737 (S.D. 1985).
16. Mexican v. Circle Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737, 739 (S.D. 1985).
17. Id. at 742.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c) (1988). North Dakota has not, however, accepted jurisdiction
over Indian land except in very circumscribed instances. See State v. Hook, 476 N.W.2d
565 (N.D. 1991).
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mandates that state courts apply any type of traditional law in
adjudicating disputes among Indian people. As a result, a state
court may apply laws, especially in the area of family law, which
starkly contradict Indian traditional values.' 9 A tribal court, when
confronted with a state decree premised upon state law in conflict
with tribal tradition, is placed in the unenviable position of defying
tradition or appearing to ignore the authority of a state court.
Of course, a state could enact a law which requires tribal law
and custom to be looked to in resolving purely internal tribal disputes, should one arise within a state's jurisdiction. Such a law,
however, may be frowned upon by state legislators who may feel
constrained to permit its judges to apply different standards
dependent upon the race of the litigants even though the concept
of "Indian" has been recognized, not as a racial characteristic, but
as a political status that carries with it a special relationship
between Indians and the federal government.' 0 Whether that
political characteristic permits disparate treatment of Indians by a
state is more dubious, however. 2 '
Another tribal consideration in embarking on a full faith and
credit policy is the extent to which state courts will honor the sovereignty of the tribe and its entities.2 2 More and more frequently,
tribes are starting business and political ventures which require
them to operate outside of the exterior boundaries of the reservation and therefore within the realm of state authority. By doing
so, a tribe is not in any way waiving its traditional immunity from
suit, which it is rightfully entitled as a sovereign entity. Many
states have been reluctant to acknowledge this immunity and have
argued vehemently against it.2 3 These perceived unwarranted
encroachments upon tribal sovereignty may have a chilling effect
upon the willingness of a tribe to enact full faith and credit legisla19. For example, most state courts would refuse to award custody of a child to a nonparent except when exceptional circumstances exist. A tribal court, however, places much
more emphasis on the traditional role grandparents play in the rearing of children and
would be much more inclined to grant custody to a grandparent.
20. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 (1974).
21. Although the Morton Court recognized that Indians have a special status vis-a-vis
the federal government, it did not address the Indian-state relationship. Morton, 417 U.S. at
551.
This issue may arise in the education context as state-controlled institutions, such as the
University of North Dakota, strive to retain their Indian preference scholarship programs in
the face of recent Department of Education threats to terminate federal funding to those
institutions that grant scholarships solely on the basis of race.
22. Indian tribes have historically enjoyed the common law immunity from suit
enjoyed by other sovereigns. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59
(1978); A & P Steel v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 874 F.2d 550, 552 (8th Cir. 1989).
23. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Bank of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 111 S. Ct.
905 (1991).
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tion, except in limited cases. For example, a case may arise in
which a state court when acting within its judicial authority
refuses to acknowledge tribal sovereignty and a tribal court may
be called upon to place its imprimatur upon such a decision.
This cautionary approach may be changing, however, because
the federal courts, once thought of as the last great bastion of tribal
rights protection, have increasingly become more hostile to tribal
rights, 24 whereas many state courts have demonstrated a desire to
accommodate tribal interests.25 One state has even taken steps to
issue proclamations acknowledging the status of Indian tribes as
sovereign nations. 6 Such steps greatly facilitate the ultimate

objective of tribal/state cooperative ventures and may well allay
tribal concerns over their protections in state courts.
The last consideration discussed in this article is the recent
legislative proposals to condition legislation mandating full faith
and credit of tribal court decisions upon a restriction of a tribal
27
court's jurisdiction over non-Indians and non-member Indians.
From a tribal perspective, this is a very negative development.
These legislative efforts, promoted as pro-tribal legislation, are
24. The Unites States Supreme Court's most recent decisions impacting upon tribal
interests have almost uniformly been disappointing to tribal advocates. See Blatchford v.
Native Village of Noatake, 111 S.Ct. 2578 (1991) (holding that Indian tribes could not sue
under the l1th Amendment unless the state gave consent); County of Yakima v. Yakima
Indian Nation, 112 S.Ct. 683 (1992) (holding that counties could tax Indian lands); Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that a tribe could not assert jurisdiction over nonmember Indians); Employment Div. Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that peyote use is not protected under the 1st Amendment and the
state could deny unemployment benefits to employees fired for peyote use); Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that even though building
roads on sacred Indian grounds was against government policy, Indians had no right to sue
when such roads were built). But see Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U.S. 30 (1989) (upheld Indian jurisdiction over adoption decree and voided state decree in
favor of tribal authority).
25. See Tracey v. Superior Court, 810 P.2d 1030 (Ariz. 1991) (holding that tribal court
is recognized as an entity under the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses
from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings); Alegria v. Redcherries, 812 P.2d 1085 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1991) (finding that father of child could not avoid subsequent tribal court custody
award after having an opportunity to contest it earlier).
26. On August 4, 1989, the State of Washington and the federally recognized Indian
Tribes entered into a "Centennial Accord" in which the State of Washington expressly
acknowledged the sovereignty of the Indian tribes located within its borders. Centennial
Accord between Recognized Tribes and State of Washington, Aug. 4, 1989, State of
Washington Federally Recognized Indian Tribes [hereinafter Accord].
27. In proposed legislation that became Pub. L. No. 101-511, a law that restored to
tribes criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians lost by the decision in Duro v. Reina,
many Senators, especially Senator Gorton of Washington, proposed to condition the grant
of jurisdiction and full faith and credit of tribal decisions upon federal court review of tribal
court decisions. Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1892 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1992)). That provision was not included in the bill because
of ardent tribal opposition. Other bills involving tribal courts, such as the Judicial
Enhancement Act and the Indian Tribal Courts Act of 1991, are also in the Congress. S.
667, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 752, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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nothing more than naked attempts to emasculate tribal sovereignty under the guise of strengthening tribal courts. Most tribes
are opposed to legislation which effectively allows a federal court
to oversee the operations of tribal court systems because this
would constitute a huge intrusion into the rights of sovereign
power.
Congress should not be the ultimate arbiter in reaching resolutions between states and tribes on issues of full faith and credit.
Only when states afford the tribes the respect due a sovereign
entity and when the tribes reciprocate with similar treatment will
comity and full faith and credit become a permanent fixture on
the legal landscape.

